THE CULTURAL APPROACH TO GEOPOLITICS: A METHOD OR AN ATTITUDE? by Claval, Paul et al.
THE CULTURAL APPROACH TO GEOPOLITICS: 
A METHOD OR AN ATTITUDE? 
Fabrizio EVA 
University of Venice, “Ca’ Foscari, Treviso Campus, Italy 
The “cultural shift” in geography reclaims views from the past. It cannot be otherwise. 
Some decades ago, and not without controversy, Jacques Monod proposed the theory of 
chance and necessity (Monod, 2001) in describing the genetic evolution of human beings and 
other life forms. According to him, mutations constantly occur by chance; some become 
established, others disappear. Established mutations cannot do other than have consequences 
that produce hereditary genetic lines. The controversy stemmed from extending this theory to 
the formation of ideas. 
Paul Feyerabend applied the same concept (with even greater controversy and opposition) 
to the development of scientific thought, maintaining - provocatively as far as supporters of 
the rationality and continuity of science were concerned - that “everything goes” (Feyerabend, 
1984) in progressing human consciousness, not only the scientific rationalism endorsed by 
scientists and academics. This “everything goes” approach includes the rediscovery of ideas 
from the past as well as the “reinvention” of the past in cases where the “inventor” has no idea 
that their idea is not original. Dismissing the past makes it necessary to discover it again, since 
no one is ever sure what has been already been said. However, it can also happen that not 
everything is rediscovered or that there were better things to rediscover that went unnoticed. 
In general and in geography, the cultural approach tends toward the philosophy of Monod 
and Feyerabend rather than toward stances that support “scientific” methods. It stresses the 
importance - even the centrality- of cultural elements (of individuals and human groups) in 
analyzing territories. It is not of secondary importance that ways of life - incorrectly defined 
by some as “civilization” - in the broad sense are deeply interwoven with collective symbols 
and consciousnesses that have been constructed or have simply developed through time. 
Because of their complexity, as well as their indeterminacy, these concepts are rejected by 
those looking for clear-cut conceptual frameworks. But as early as the beginning of the 20th 
century, Henri Poincaré defended the validity of intuition over logic (Poincaré, 2003) in 
understanding the highly relative fiction that is “reality.” Coming from a renowned 
mathematician, this was a brave statement. 
Certainly, many of the elements discussed in “cultural” spheres need to be treated with 
caution, but these elements provide a much wider scope for understanding, particularly for 
those who, like geographers, interpret the effects of a culture on space in a general-theoretical 
sense or on specific territories. What is more, adopting a cultural approach to geography 
ensures that we do not leave politics out of the equation or act as “technicians,” providing 
politicians with neutral frameworks for interpreting territorial dynamics. Space, in other 
words, must be seen as a continual crystallization and overlaying of cultural factors and power 
dynamics: “Space is fundamental in every form of community life; space is fundamental in 
every case that power is exercised” (Foucault, 2001, p. 68). 
If we speak of culture and power relationships in these terms, the concept of genre de vie 
returns to the fore. There is no doubt that its “rediscovery” is useful, but using what approach? 
And what do we mean by “culture”? 
Elisée Reclus’ approach was substantially different from that of Vidal de la Blache, 
although both stressed the importance of genre de vie. Given that Reclus has been forgotten 
while Vidal de la Blache has produced more damage than positive conceptual outcomes 
(Levy, 1999), it is Reclus’ wider and more flexible concept of genre de vie that it is worth re-
examining - partly because, it seems to me, that it is a lot closer to what we mean today by the 
term “culture.” This is because it also takes into account the dynamics and relationships of 
power in space and how these relationships of power crystallize within a territory (Reclus, 
1905). 
Culture is a concept with very hazy borders. 
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First, culture’s relationship with, and dependence on, territory have not been adequately 
discussed or clarified. From the determinist views of the 19th century, we passed on to the 
non-determinist views of the 20th century, but the specific study of human behavior was 
conducted by sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists with scant reference to the 
relationship with space. A generic “environment” and the factors influencing it are quite 
different from the complex characteristics unique to a territory and how human beings 
organize societies. Greater integration between geography and the above-mentioned 
disciplines is needed by those who adopt the cultural approach. 
Second, there is a strong relationship between culture and history, which for geographers is 
always a love/hate relationship. But which history? Is it history with a lowercase “h,” made up 
of the recollections of those who actually lived through it, but closely related to the majority of 
the territorial crystallizations we spoke of earlier? Or is it with a capital “H,” that is, the 
history narrated in books, in official rhetoric, the one studied at school, but which crystallizes 
itself only partially (although pompously) within the territory? 
Reclus’ cultural approach favors history with a small "h" because it asserts that the main - 
although not the only - players in history and the environmental milieu are individuals and 
human groups and their daily ways of life. Individuals are undoubtedly influenced en masse 
by emotions, ideals, and charismatic men (women suffer from millennia-old political-spatial 
segregation of varying degrees of severity in almost every culture), but it is the exponential 
effect of individuals that (consciously or unconsciously) make history and consolidate and 
crystallize its effect in space.  
In the context of geopolitical analysis, the recent critical approach (particularly in the 
English-speaking world) has developed notably and the cultural dimension has been an 
important element in critical thought. This is because the majority of the players in, and 
commentators of, recent geopolitical dynamics have largely referred to words/concepts such 
as ethnicity, people, nation, religious fundamentalism, and so on, often taking their meaning 
for granted and/or treating them as synonyms of a specific culture. They are, however, 
ambiguous concepts that can lead to dangerous interpretations. 
In looking for reasons for the recent post-cold war conflicts around the world, opinion 
leaders (and academics) have had to “mold” concepts that have appeared out-of-date in the 
Western political culture of Europe and America, and they have done it without wishing to 
touch that “rational” conceptual framework that hinges the state, the “neutral” identity of 
citizens, and “democratic” political representation as its untouchable points of reference. It can 
be discussed, but without ever doubting its value and superiority to other points of view. 
The dangerous paradox of acting in this way is that we have now confirmed another 
certainty, and that is that so-called ethnic groupings exist as an absolute and a-historic value 
and that the state must take them into account when dealing with issues of domestic 
minorities. This approach confuses, or renders ambiguous, the concept of minority and 
prevents dealing with political issues, and their relative territorial issues, with sufficient open 
mindedness and coordinated tools. For an example, we can take the current case of Iraq. There 
is a belief that the internal conflicts can be resolved by setting up a government constructed by 
metering out ministerial positions to representatives from all of the important and identifiable 
groups present: the Kurds, the Bedouins, the Sunnites, different Shiite groups, and… women! 
The supposed political rationalism of the West is meant to give order and method to the 
subjective, dynamic, and relational dimensions of the sense of belonging of human beings in a 
different geographical and cultural area. It is quite reasonable, in my opinion, to have a few 
doubts about the success of such an approach. Other premises and other ways of interpreting 
the relationship between territory and human groups are needed here. 
This is why, despite its essential uncertainly, the cultural approach is very useful in 
geopolitical analysis - provided it is not regarded as a certain and unequivocal interpretative 
method. The areas in which it can be applied that are most useful in understanding geopolitical 
dynamics are:  
1) relational patterns in ways of life (an updated version of genre de vie),  
2) consciousness (collective and individual, pre-existing and/or produced). 
How and to what degree these areas overlap and how and to what degree to they 
correspond to established social practices and to symbolic constructs that orient and produce 
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behaviors and political decision-making is the testing ground of the cultural approach in 
geopolitics. 
By relational patterns in ways of life I am referring to the type of interpersonal 
relationships in daily life that take the form of accepted customs. These take place between 
blood relations, people with things in common, outsiders, and “others” - that is people who are 
different from us or foreign. Mentally, this all takes the form of things one takes for granted, 
that is, what people would describe as “that’s just the way things are” and is perpetuated 
through the family, common language, and key symbolic words. We are referring to the 
complex of behaviors defined as right or wrong, as things one should and should not do 
(Feyerabend, 1984, pp. 188; 194). 
What is customary in one’s life influences the perception of “reality” of individuals and 
groups, conditioning their reactions to new events. To use Jean Gottmann’s terminology, this 
represents an iconography of resistance to what is new, that is, to circulation. 
What is customary in one’s life also influences the perception of “reality” of politicians 
and leaders, therefore influencing political decisions. 
At the level of the collective consciousness, customs are so-called “common ground,” that 
is, opinions, ideas, supposed popular wisdom, and so on that can become widely shared 
mental habits and, therefore, exploited politically or ideologically. They can also be 
“constructed” for political and ideological ends (Anderson, 1991). 
Consciousness interpreted in this sense is made of four principal elements: (a) myth, (b) 
symbols, (c) imagery (politico-ideological), (d) self-regard (self-esteem). 
All these elements have iconographic characteristics but they survive, or are successful, 
because of active reiteration (if they are already present in a society) or propaganda/reiteration 
(if they need to be “constructed” to become accepted common ground). Their strength as icons 
is based on political will and the activism of groups (parties, associations, and so on) or 
leaders, but the active role of those receiving the message, who must first interiorize it before 
transforming it into an icon, cannot be disregarded. The best example is the myth/narrative of 
the origins and virtues (which are always special and “superior”) of ethnic groups or 
“nations.” 
In this active role, the tools used to spread the story become highly important as does their 
“scope,” that is, the breadth of the group of people whom the message can reach. The 
substantial differences in the effectiveness of leaflets, posters, movies, newspapers, and 
television are obvious. It’s hardly a chance event that this latter medium has become an 
essential tool for spreading “information,” which is, in reality, a means of constructing myths 
and symbols through the presentation of narratives that explain what’s happening (or has 
happened) to people who don’t know. (Virilio, 2000) 
The control of television by political leaders, as well as economic leaders, has become 
increasingly vital for presenting the “truth,” given that the traditional tools for constructing 
myths, symbols, and imagery – that is, books, schools, intellectuals – have gradually lost their 
influence and effectiveness as we have moved away from being a society of words to a society 
of images. (Chomsky, 1994) 
The consequence of this is that to be satisfactory, geopolitical analysis must hone its 
abilities to read information through an awareness of how to assess what sources are useful 
and what news is significant, accepting among them sources that are “popular” and not just 
academic or “authoritative.” It is precisely in this process that the cultural approach proves the 
most effective, since it is very similar to the intuition that Poincaré spoke about a century ago. 
This field of study is a minefield in which the observer runs the risk of straying outside the 
uncertain boundary that divides an analysis based on a method (although not being a method) 
from comments based on prejudice or generic common ground. For this reason, there remains 
a certain diffidence among many to accept such an approach, partly because the analytical-
methodological approach prevails in the field of scientific research. 
In the social reality, just as in the field of academic analysis (and not just geopolitics), 
there is, once again, conflict between the champions of coherent conceptual frameworks (to 
give sense to things) and those who prefer dynamic fragmentation (which produces freedom 
and new ideas, although uncertainly as well). 
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The following table shows the nature of the connections that a cultural approach can 
highlight between different conceptual factors that play a role in geopolitical dynamics. 
 
 HISTORICIZED CONVENTIONS 
ESTABLISHED 
CONVENTIONS
CONSTRUCTED 
CONVENTION 
TOOLS AND 
INSTITUTIONS 
THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF CONVENTION 
 KEYWORDS CUSTOMS 
CONSCIOUSNESS 
Things that are taken 
granted, accepted as 
normal 
CONVENTIONS 
Tradition (stable for 
conceptual framework) 
 Ethnic group, 
People  
Myth (Self-regard 
individual/collective) 
Books school slogans 
(stable conceptual 
framework) 
 
Nation, state One cannot live without the state 
Politico-ideological 
imagery 
Books, school, 
intelectuals (stable 
conceptual framework) 
 (Nation, state) 
Little interest in 
and little 
knowledge of, 
individuals 
conceptual 
framework 
Television 
Repetition, “truth, 
information” (stable 
conceptual framework) 
ICONOGRAPHY Culture 
Traditional 
social 
Relationships 
Common ground 
(taken for granted, 
accepted) 
Tradition (stable 
conceptual framework) 
   Self –regard (individual/colective) 
Desire for freedom 
Security (individual 
and collective), 
Stability (stable 
conceptual framework) 
CIRCULATION Movement factor 
Individual 
choices 
Self-regard regard 
(individual/collect.) 
Desire for freedom 
(openness/flexibility) 
 
The cultural approach accepts uncertainty and fragmentation (of sources, signs, imagery) 
and this means that geopolitical dynamics are read in a different way. It gives importance to 
ways of life, which are dynamically consolidated and change slowly, and also takes the 
psychological dimension of individuals and human groups into account. In analyzing 
geopolitical dynamics such as Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Kashmir, Afghanistan, and the conflicts in 
Africa, the ideological/diplomatic approach of international relations, which are so rhetorical 
and nominalistic, is too theoretical and not sufficiently exhaustive. The most tragic aspect is 
that it is only on the basis of such a viewpoint that the “solutions” and strategies for exiting 
from dramatic conflicts with high costs in human lives are conceived. An example is the 
current crisis in Darfur (Sudan), where everything seems to hinge on the formal acceptance by 
international bodies and governments of the term genocide and the tools for action don’t go 
beyond the umpteenth threat of an embargo. Political visions of the so-called international 
order would seem to pay little attention to human beings and their deepest characteristics, that 
is, the ever-difficult balance between the desire for freedom and the desire for stability, which 
often takes the cultural form of a sense of belonging. 
The cultural approach does not close the door on the intuition discussed by Poincaré, 
Feyerabend, Reclus, and many other common mortals. Since it is not a rigid and structured 
method, it makes it possible to understand better and more.  
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